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I.

INTRODUCTION

Legal malpractice is hardly a recent development in the United
States.' The frequency of litigation against attorneys, however, has
increased rapidly over the past two decades, 2 and the attack is unlikely

1. The first legal malpractice case in the United States was Stephens v. White, 2 Va. 203
(1776), noted in D. MEISELMAN, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW & PROCEDURE 339 (1980).
Several recent books deal exclusively with legal malpractice: D. HORAN & G. SPELLMIRE,
LEGAL MALPRACTICE: PREVENTION AND DEFENSE (1987); D. MEISELMAN, supra; D. STERN
&J. FELIX-RETZKE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PREVENTING LEGAL MALPRACTICE (1983);
R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (2d ed. 1981

& Supp.

1985).

2. According to one study, "more legal malpractice cases have been reported at the appellate
level in the last 15 years than in the preceding 70 years. Insurance claims data confirm the
increase in lawsuits against attorneys in general and litigators in particular." Peters & Robinson,
The Elements of a Legal Malpractice Case Based on Litigation Errors, 28 PRAC. LAW. 53,
53-54 (1982). For discussion of the increasing number of malpractice actions against attorneys,

see Castle, Review Claims Legal Malpractice Verdicts Averaged $43,575, 71 A.B.A. J. 122
(1985); Gates, Lawyers' Malpractice:Some Recent DataAbout a Growing Problem, 37 MERCER
L. REV. 559 (1986); Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69
GEo. L.J. 705, 732-34 (1981); Sepler, Professional Malpractice Litigation Crisis: Danger or
Distortion?, 15 Forum 493 (1980).
For discussion of the large increase in suits filed by doctors against attorneys for malicious

prosecution, see Birnbaum, Physicians Counterattack:Liability of Lawyers for Instituting Unjustified Medical Malpractice Actions, 45 FORDHAm L. REV. 1003 (1977); Note, Physicians'
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to abate. Public impatience with legal negligence and unethical be-

havior,3 reflected in the high number of suits against attorneys, has
forced courts to refine traditional malpractice standards. More and
more, courts are using the American Bar Association's professional
4
standards, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code")
and the recently enacted Model Rules of Professional Conduct
("Rules"), 5 to determine standards for civil liability in legal malpractice
6
actions.
On January 1, 1987, the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct
replaced the Code of Professional Responsibility as the primary legislation regulating the conduct of the Florida Bar. 7 Florida's courts and
attorneys must be prepared to face difficult questions concerning the
role of the Rules in civil actions against attorneys. The Rules could
play a much greater role in the civil liability of attorneys than did the
Code.8 The Rules reflect a shift away from aspirational standards of
abstract morality toward the development of a black letter law of
professional responsibility, 9 and reflect an increased concern for the
rights of non-clients.1° These two developments make the Rules more
appropriate than the Code for use in civil actions against attorneys."

Countersuits:Malicious Prosecution,Defamation and Abuse of Process as Remediesfor Meritless Medical MalpracticeSuits, 45 U. CIN. L. REV. 604 (1976); Comment, Malicious Prosecution: An Effective Attack on Spurious Medical Malpractice Claims?, 26 CASE W. REs. 653
(1976).

3. See A.B.A.

SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PRO-

(1970); A STRICK, INJUSALL (1977); Auerbach, The Legal Profession After Watergate, 22 WAYNE L. REV.
1287 (1976); Wolfram, Barriers to Effective Public Participationin Regulation of the Legal
Profession, 62 MINN. L. REV. 619, 621-25 (1978).
One commentator, however, has argued that the problem of lawyer incompetence has been
exaggerated by both the popular press and professional journals. Frankel, Curing Lawyers'
Incompetence: Primum Non Nocere, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 613 (1977).
4. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981) ("Code") [hereinafter CODE].
The Code was adopted by the American Bar Association in 1969. Before the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct were adopted in August, 1983, every state used the Code, or standards
closely resembling the Code, as the authoritative rules governing the professional lives of attorneys. See Wolfram, supra note 3, at 632.
5. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) ("Rules") [hereinafter RULES].
6. See infra notes 18-59 and accompanying text.
7. The Florida Bar Re: Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 494 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1986).
8. See infra notes 171-249 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 185-201 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 233-50 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 171-249 and accompanying text.
BLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT
TICE FOR
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Although the Code governed the Florida Bar for over sixteen
years,' 2 Florida plaintiffs rarely relied on it in civil actions. 13 The
recent adoption of the Rules, however, and their increased use in civil
actions, will bring attention to these standards and may encourage
plaintiffs and defendants to employ them. To give Florida courts and
attorneys a preview of what may come, section II of this note provides
a national survey of Code applications and certain recent Rules cases
in civil actions against attorneys. 14 The next section discusses the
major arguments supporting and rejecting an extensive use of the
Code in malpractice actions.' 5 Section IV compares several aspects of
the Code and the Rules and concludes that the Rules are better suited
as standards for the civil liability of attorneys.' 6 The note concludes
that Florida courts should not hesitate to use the Rules in civil actions
7
against attorneys.'
II.

PRESENT USE OF THE CODE IN CIVIL ACTIONS
AGAINST ATTORNEYS

A complete understanding of when courts apply the Code in civil
actions against attorneys rests on an important distinction. Many
courts are not averse to applying the Code in "client v. attorney"
negligence actions to determine whether the attorney breached a duty
owed to the client under the common law. ' No court, however, has
12. The Florida Supreme Court adopted the Code on June 3, 1970, effective Oct. 1, 1970.
In re Integration Rule of the Florida Bar, 235 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1970). The Rules replaced the
Code on Jan. 1, 1987. See The Florida Bar Re: Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 494 So. 2d
977 (Fla. 1986).
13. Florida courts have stated that "it is the duty of the courts to see to it that the Canons
of Professional Responsibility are complied vith." Brassell v. Brethauer, 305 So. 2d 217, 220
(Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1974). The Code has infrequently been applied, however, in civil actions against
attorneys. See, e.g., Oberon Invs. v. Angel, Cohen & Rogovin, 492 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1986); Hatcher v. Roberts, 478 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1985) (concerning presentation of
affirmative defenses in legal malpractice action, court mentioned Code, but did not base its
decision on it); Fee, Parker & Lloyd, P.A. v. Sullivan, 379 So. 2d 412 (4th D.C.A.) (court turned
to Code provisions on zealous representation in narrowly interpreting probable cause element
in malicious prosecution action), cert. denied, 368 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1980); Adams v. Chenowith,
349 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1977). For a discussion of Oberon and Adams, see infra notes
52-58 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 18-91 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 92-170 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 171-249 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 253-59 and accompanying text.
18. For example, in Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966),
the court explicitly invoked the California Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA Canons
of Ethics to determine a conflict of interest question when an attorney represented both the
husband and the wife in a divorce. The court held the attorney had the duty to fully disclose
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applied the Code to create a duty to a non-client if no duty existed
under the common law.19 In other words, courts use the Code to
further traditional common law tort actions, but do not use the Code
to create new causes of action.20
A.

Code Use to Define Duties to Clients

Many courts have relied on the Code in traditional malpractice
actions between attorneys and former clients.21 The Code is commonly
applied in actions for negligence due to conflict of interest2 and
breaches of fiduciary obligation.2 Courts have also used Code provithe conflicting interests to both parties and to advise them of the desirability of separate counsel
in order to protect the interests of both parties. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Tomlin, 593 F.2d 33
(6th Cir. 1979), rev'd in part, affd in part, 616 F.2d 924 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 888 (1980); Kirsch v. Duryea, 21 Cal. 3d 303, 578 P.2d 935, 146 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1978); Day
v. Rosenthal, 170 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1267
(1986); Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968); Rogers v. Robson,
Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 74 Ill. App. 3d 467, 392 N.E.2d 1365 (1979), qffd, 81 111.
2d 201, 407 N.E.2d 47 (1980); Estate of Younger, 314 Pa. Super. 480, 461 A.2d 259 (1983); see
also R. MALLEN & V. LEvirr, supra note 1, § 256 n.11 (list of cases).
19. See infra notes 60-90 and accompanying text.
20. See Dahlquist, The Code of Professional Responsibility and Civil Damage Actions
Against Attorneys, 9 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 1, 6 (1982). Several commentators, however, have
failed to point out this distinction. See, e.g., Faure & Strong, The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct: No Standardfor Malpractice, 47 MONT. L. REV. 363 (1986); Wolfram, The Code of
Professional Responsibility as a Measure of Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C.L.
REV. 281 (1979); Comment, Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility as Stating a
Cause of Action in Legal Malpractice, 6 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 692 (1979). As a result, their
analyses do not accurately demonstrate the circumstances in which courts use the Code. Nor
do these analyses provide an adequate framework for analyzing the arguments for and against
a more expanded use.
21. See cases cited supra note 18.
22. See, e.g., Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968); Ishmael
v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966).
23. See, e.g., Hicks v. Clayton, 67 Cal. App. 3d 251, 136 Cal. Rptr. 512 (1977); Sherman
v. Klopfer, 32 Ill. App. 3d 519, 336 N.E.2d 219 (1975); Peaslee v. Pedco, Inc., 388 A.2d 103
(Me. 1978).
Interestingly, the Code is less often applied to the most common type of malpractice, neglect
missing deadlines, forgetting court appearances, etc. Luvera, How to Avoid Legal Malpractice,
31 Mo. B.J. 127, 127 n.2 (1975). Most courts and commentators view DR 6-101, the relevant
Code provision, as vague and ambiguous. See Hazard, Legal Ethics: Legal Rules and Professional
Aspirations, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 571, 573 (1982). DR 6-101 states:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know
that he is not competent to handle...
(2) Handle a legal matter wvithout preparation adequate
in the circumstances.
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
CODE, supra note 4, DR 6-101; see Dahlquist, supra note 20, at 10-11 (Code application in
'neglect" cases does not appreciably alter or define the negligence standard).
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sions in actions concerning withdrawl,- disqualification,- and attorneys' fees.2 6 These courts justify Code use by analogizing the Code to
criminal statutes or administrative regulations. 27 Just as the effect of
violating a criminal statute varies in each jurisdiction, so does the
effect of a Code violation.28 Courts have applied the Code to establish
negligence per se,2 as evidence of negligence, ° or to create a rebuttable presumption of negligence.3' In contrast, some courts do not consider the Code relevant at all.32
Some courts have held that a blatant violation of the state's ethical
standards is negligence per se and can eliminate the need for expert
testimony. 3 For example, in Day v. Rosenthal,3 an attorney sued his
former clients for breach of contract. The former clients countersued
for breach of fiduciary duty, legal malpractice, fraud, and abuse of
process. The California appellate court found that the attorney had
violated a "litany" of California's Rules of Professional Conduct.sG The
Day court held that the Rules conclusively determined an attorney's
duties'3 7 and that expert testimony could not alter such a blatant

24. See, e.g., Kirsch v. Duryea, 21 Cal. 3d 303, 578 P.2d 935, 146 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1978);
Lipton v. Boesky, 110 Mich. App. 509, 313 N.W.2d 163 (1981); Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wash.
App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238 (1975).
25. See, e.g., Cannon v. United States Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1975)
(Canons 4 & 5 relied on to disqualify counsel), affd in part, revd in part, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th
Cir. 1976); G.A.C. Commercial Corp. v. Mahoney Typographers, Inc., 66 Mich. App. 186, 238
N.W.2d 575 (1975) (Canons 4, 5 & 9 relied on to disqualify counsel).
26. See, e.g., Nolan v. Foreman, 665 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1982); Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill.
App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978); Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238
(1975).
27. See infra notes 92-111 and accompanying text.
28. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
36 (5th ed. 1984).
29. See, e.g., Day v. Rosenthal, 170 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1985); Estate
of Younger, 314 Pa. Super. 480, 461 A.2d 259 (1983).
30. See, e.g., Kirsch v. Duryea, 21 Cal. 3d 305, 578 P.2d 935, 146 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1978);
Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968); Ishmael v. Millington, 241
Cal. App. 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966); see generally infranotes 45-50 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Lipton v. Boesky, 110 Mich. App. 589, 313 N.W.2d 163 (1981).
32. See, e.g., Tingle v. Arnold, Cate & Allen, 129 Ga. App. 134, 199 S.E.2d 260 (1973);
Bush v. Morris, 123 Ga. App. 497, 181 S.E.2d 503 (1971); Hehnbrecht v. Saint Paul Ins. Co.,
122 Wis. 2d 94, 362 N.W.2d 118 (1985).
33. See, e.g., Day v. Rosenthal, 170 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1267 (1986).
34. 170 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1267 (1986).
35. Id. at 1133, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
36. Id. at 1147-48, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 102-03.
37. Id. at 1147, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
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violation of the Rules. Since the Rules determined the standard of
care in legal malpractice actions, the court found expert testimony
was not necessary to hold the attorney liable.3
Far more often Code violations merely serve as evidence of a
breach of the general reasonable person standard.3 9 One court expressed the legal malpractice standard of care as "ordinary care . . .
governed by the established standards of professional ethics." 4 This
approach prevails in conflict of interest cases. 41 The Code has been
applied, for example, in cases in which an attorney simultaneously
represented an insurer and insured, 42 a debtor and creditor, 43 and a

husband and wife involved in divorce.In Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belon 4 an
attorney represented both an insurer and the insured. The attorney
received a settlement offer that the insurer, but not the insured,
wished to accept. The attorney accepted the offer on behalf of both
clients without knowledge of the insured. 46 The Rogers court primarily
applied common law principles as expressed in the Code. 47 Because
the Code represents a guide for proper attorney conduct, the court
recognized that it would be anomalous to hold professional standards
of ethics irrelevant in tort actions. 48 Therefore, the court applied the
standards and language of Code Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 5-107, 49 finding that when the conflict first arose the attorney should have made
full and fair disclosure about the conflict of interest to both parties
and obtained consent from both clients before continuing representation. The attorney's failure to satisfy the duties established by the
Code was evidence that he failed his duty to represent his client with
ordinary care .

0

38. Id.
39. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 30.
40. Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 149, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 415 (1968).
41. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 42-44.
42. See Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865 (W.D. Wis. 1977); infra notes
45-50 and accompanying text; see generally Note, Standard of Care in Malpractice Actions
Against InsuranceDefense Counsel: Inapplicabilityof the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility,
51 FORDHAm L. REv. 1317 (1983) (strongly condemning use of Code in actions against insurance
defense counsel).
43. In re Holmes, 290 Or. 173, 619 P.2d 1284 (1980) (attorney may not represent debtor
and collection agency in same transaction).
44. See, e.g., Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966).
45. 74111. App. 3d 467, 392 N.E.2d 1365 (1979), affd, 81 Ill.
2d 201, 407 N.E.2d 47 (1980).
46. Id. at 468, 392 N.E.2d at 1370-72.
47. Id. at 471-74, 392 N.E.2d at 1370-72.
48. Id. at 472-73, 392 N.E.2d at 1371.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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Although plaintiffs typically use the Code as a weapon to prove
that attorneys have violated its standards, attorneys have also relied
on the Code to exculpate themselves from liability.51 In the Florida
case Adams v. Chenowith,52 the defendant attorney used the conflict
of interest Code provisions to disprove allegations of legal malpractice.0 The attorney represented a vendor in a land sale agreement.
After the conclusion of the transaction, the vendee sued the attorney
for negligent preparation of a closing statement that caused the vendee
to overpay the vendor. The attorney asserted that the Code prohibited
him from representing both the vendor and the vendee. Partly relying
on the Code, the court held that the attorney did not owe a duty to
the vendee and could not be liable to the vendee for negligence.-5
Few Florida courts have directly addressed the application of the
Code in civil actions.- In one recent Florida decision, however, violation of the Code was not proof of negligence per se. 56 The court mentioned, in dicta, that a violation may serve as evidence of negligence.57
Therefore, most Florida courts likely will take the familiar position
that the Code is proper evidence to help define an existing duty.
Many courts consider violation of the Code as at least evidence of
an attorney's liability for negligence or breach of fiduciary duty.- One
commentator has suggested this form of Code use is acceptable to the
courts because Code provisions concerning fiduciary obligations and
conflicting interests accurately restate common law positions.- 9 Therefore, Code use to help define common law duties between an attorney
and client is widespread and is not controversial.
B.

Code Use to Create Duties to Non-Clients

Unlike the widespread Code applications to define common law
duties, 60 courts have steadfastly refused to use the Code to create

51. See, e.g., Kirsch v. Duryea, 21 Cal. App. 3d 303, 146 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1978); Adams v.
Chenowith, 349 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1977); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Holt, 36 N.C. App.
284, 244 S.E.2d 177 (1978).
52. 349 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1977).
53. Id. at 231.

54. Id.
55.
56.
1986).
57.
58.
59.
60.

See cases cited supra note 13.
Oberon Invs. v. Angel, Cohen & Rogovin, 492 So. 2d 1113, 1114 n.2 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
Id.
See supra notes 21-57 and accompanying text.
R. MLALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 122, at 213.
See supra notes 21-59 and accompanying text.
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duties to non-clients.61 Based on notions of privity,62 courts have been
unwilling to find that the Code creates private causes of action.6 The
typical case involves a medical malpractice defendant who prevails in
the malpractice action and then sues the opposing party and attorney
for malicious prosecution. " The malpractice defendant, turned plaintiff,
fails to prove an element of the stringent malicious prosecution action
and therefore falls back on the Code to establish the attorney's liability.
Although courts have assessed fees and other court sanctions for bad
faith claimsj they refuse to use Code provisions to support these
types of actions.6
In Brody v. Ruby,67 the doctor-plaintiff sued the former opposing
attorney for malicious prosecution and negligence based on a Code
violation. The doctor failed to satisfy the special injury requirement
of malicious prosecution, 69 and relied on two Code provisions to support
his negligence claim. The doctor alleged that the former opposing
attorney handled the matter without adequate preparation, in violation
of DR 6-101(A)(2).70 He also alleged that the attorney filed the suit
when he knew or should have known the action would serve merely
to harass or maliciously injure the doctor, in violation of DR 7-102.71
The Iowa Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiffs suit and held that
the Code does not impose liability for negligence to a third party.72
Courts traditionally give three reasons for rejecting the Code as
a basis for private causes of action. First, Code drafters did not intend
to create private causes of action.7 3 Second, plaintiffs are adequately

61. See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa), afifd, 590 F.2d 341 (8th
Cir. 1978); Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975); Berlin v. Nathan,
64 Il. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828 (1979); Brody v. Ruby,
267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978); Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980); Bob Godfrey
Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 291 Or. 318, 630 P.2d 840 (1981).
62. See infra notes 136-67 and accompanying text.
63. See cases cited supra note 61.
64. See, e.g., Bickel, 447 F. Supp. at 1376; Berlin, 64 Ill. App. 3d at 940, 381 N.E.2d at
1367; Nelson, 227 Kan. at 271, 607 P.2d at 438; O'Toole, 279 Or. at 513, 569 P.2d at 561; Ayyildiz
v. Kidd, 220 Va. 1080, 266 S.E.2d 108 (1980).
65. 'See infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
66. See cases cited supra note 61.
67. 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978).
68. Id. at 903.
69. Id. at 904-05.
70. Id. at 906.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 907.
73. See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1383 (N.D. Iowa), affd, 590 F.2d 341
(8th Cir. 1978); Brody, 267 N.W.2d at 907.
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protected by existing remedies such as malicious prosecution and abuse
of process. 4 Finally, extending attorney liability to non-clients would
be contrary to the public interest.-5 These courts contend that attorneys would hesitate to accept weak cases, denying potential plaintiffs
'76
"freedom of access to the courts.
Some courts, however, have hinted that Code provisions could be
authority for private causes of action.- In O'Toole v. Franklin,7 the
Oregon Supreme Court suggested that an attorney could be liable for
an intentional violation of a statutory duty to non-clients 9 Although
the court explicitly rejected a negligence theory of liability, 8° it
reasoned that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelders' was analogous to civil actions against attorneys. s In Ernst, the Court held that an intentional violation of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 prohibiting "manipulative or deceptive devices," might support civil liability of accountants to third parties, while mere negligence would not.Y In O'Toole, however, the
plaintiffs failed to plead a statutory cause of action based upon an
intentional tort.- Therefore, the O'Toole court adopted the predominant view that an attorney did not owe a duty of care to a party
opponent, and the doctor's negligence claim failed. 6 Since the Code
provisions prohibiting frivolous litigation impose stricter standards
than negligence, courts could hold attorneys civilly liable for violations., 7
Attorneys have been virtually immune from liability to non-clients
because courts have unanimously rejected use of the Code by nonclients as a basis for attorney liability.88 The arguments supporting

74. See, e.g., Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 288-89, 607 P.2d 438, 451 (1980); Bob Godfrey
Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 291 Or. 318, 236, 630 P.2d 848 (1981).
75. See, e.g., Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill.
App. 3d 940, 949, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1376 (1978),
cer. dended, 444 U.S. 828 (1979); Brody, 267 N.W.2d at 906.
76. See, e.g., Brody, 267 N.W.2d at 907.
77. See, e.g., Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975); Wolfram,
.ivpra note 20, at 311 n.128.
78. 279 Or. 513, 569 P.2d 561 (1977).
79. Id. at 523-24, 569 P.2d at 566-67.
80. Id. at 524, 569 P.2d at 567.
81. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
82. O'Toole, 279 Or. at 523, 569 P.2d at 566-67.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
84. See Ernst, 425 U.S. at 185.
85. O'Toole, 279 Or. at 524, 569 P.2d at 567.
86. Id. at 523, 569 P.2d at 566-67.
87. See infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 60-87 and accompanying text.
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an expanded use of the Code, however, are persuasive1 9 In addition,
courts are seeking methods to curtail the filing of flivolous suits.9'
Therefore, courts should consider using the Code as the basis for
private causes of action.

III.

ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING AND OPPOSING THE CODE
AS A BASIS FOR CIVIL LIABILITY91

A.

Arguments Supporting an Expanded Code Use

Proponents of expanded Code applications to create private causes
of action argue that violations of the Code are analogous to violations
of criminal statutes or administrative regulations.2 Courts have traditionally held that statutes can create duties and prescribe standards
of conduct. 93 More recently, courts have employed business regulations
and professional ethics codes to ascertain standards of conduct. 94 Even
when statutes do not explicitly mention a civil remedy, courts have
often implied private causes of action.9 5 Typically, when courts apply
a criminal statute to a private action, the statute determines the
negligence standard of care,9 but courts have also used criminal sta7
tutes and administrative regulations as the basis for intentional torts.
89.
90.

See infra notes 91-111 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.

91.

See Clay, Applications of the MODEL RULES to Legal Malpractice, 1984 COMPLEAT

LAW. 37; Faure & Strong, supra note 20; Dahlquist, supra note 20; Wolfram, supra note 20;
Note, Standard of Care in MalpracticeActions Against InsuranceDefense Counsel: Inapplicability of the CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317 (1983);
Comment, The Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility: A Catalystfor Successful Legal
MalpracticeActions?, 37 MERCER L. REV. 817 (1986); Comment, supra note 20.
92. See Wolfram, supra note 20, at 286-93.
93. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAIAIES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 17.6 (1st ed. 1956); R. KEETON,
VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE 94 (1969); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 28, § 36, at
220; Morris, The Relation of CriminalStatutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARV. L. REV. 453 (1983);
Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1913).

94. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965)
(code of ethics promulgated by the medical profession admissible as evidence of medical malpractice); Piper, Jaffrey & Hopwook, Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (rules of
stock exchange and rules of association of securities dealers admissible as evidence of
stockbroker's negligence); Stogsdill v. Manor Convalescent Home, Inc., 35 Ill. App. 3d 634, 343
N.E.2d 589 (1976) (nursing home regulations used as indication of standard of care); Menzel v.
Morse, 362 N.W.2d 465 (Iowa 1985) (dealing with the Code of Realtor Ethics); see generally
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 28, § 36, at 220; Dahlquist, supra note 20, at 9-10 &
n.67; Wolfram, supra note 20, at 287 & nn.27-28.
95. W. PROSSER, & W. KEETON, supra note 28, § 36, at 220-21.
96. See Dahlquist, supra note 20, at 286.
97. Generally statutes define a standard of care for negligence. Courts have adapted statutes
for other tort actions more closely associated with the elements of the criminal or administrative
violation. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 28, § 36, at 221. Code provisions could be
adapted to serve as standards for intentional torts. See supra text accompanying notes 78-88.
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The purpose of using a criminal statute to determine a standard
of care is to further the policies of the statute and to afford greater
protection to the intended beneficiaries of the statute.9 8 Clearly, the
main policy behind the Code is to insure the proper professional conduct of attorneys.9 9 In addition, certain Code provisions protect
specified persons, particularly clients, 1°° and opposing parties.1°1 In
order to insure a high level of compliance with the Code and to fully
protect the intended beneficiaries, civil liability is necessary.10 Therefore, the Code of Professional Responsibility should be treated like
other codified law, and applicable provisions should serve as the basis
for civil actions.
For several institutional reasons, disciplinary boards are unable to
effectively deter Code violations. 1' Most disciplinary bodies are understaffed, overworked, and underfunded, °4 and are often dominated by
the group they seek to regulate. 03 Finally, evidence exists that disciplinary boards are least likely to find a Code violation for single instances of carelessness - the most prevalent type of legal malpractice. 6 Therefore, self-regulation is not sufficient to enforce the Code
or to maintain a high level of attorney competence and ethical behavior.
On the other hand, the adversary system is well-suited to insure
compliance with the Code. 1°7 The injured party's incentive to recover
money damages will insure a more vigorous prosecution of violations. 10

93.

W. PROSSER &

W.

KEETON, supra note 28, at 220-21.

99. Id.
100. See, e.g., CODE, supra note 4, DR 6-101(A) (attorney competence); CODE, supra note
4, DR 2-106 (attorney fees); CODE, supra note 4, DR 4-101 (confidentiality); CODE, supra note
4, DR 5-101, 5-105, 5-107 (conflict of interest).
101. See, e.g., CODE, szpra note 4, DR 7-102(A)(1), (2) (meritorious claims); id. DR 7-104
(communication with adverse parties).
102. Wolfram, supra note 20, at 290-91.
103. See Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession:Is It Self-Regulation?,
1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193; Martyn, supra note 2, at 705; Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients and
Professional Regulation, 1976 Ai. B. FOUND. RES. J. 917; Wolfram, supra note 3, at 630-36;
Wolfram, supra note 20, at 290-91.
The legal profession, unlike other professions, is self-regulated. Critics have argued that
self-regulation is inherently ineffective. See, e.g., Martyn, supra note 2, at 710-13, 718-19.
104. Wolfram, supra note 20, at 291.
105. See Mutnick, The Nexus Between Professional Discipline and Legal Malpractice, 2
BRIEFCASE 8 (1976); Wolfram, supra note 20, at 290-91; Note, Negligence or Incompetence of
an Attorney as GrondsforDisbarmentor Suspension, 30 NOTRE DAiE L. REV. 273 (1955).
106. A.B.A. SPECIAL COMIMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCPLINARY ENFORCEIIENT,
supra note 3; Wolfram, supra note 3, at 630, 641-42; Wolfram, supra note 20, at 291 & n.44.
107. See Wolfram, supra note 20, at 291-92.
108. Id.
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The contingent fee structure provides poor plaintiffs court access and
gives attorneys incentive to prosecute legal malpractice actions."10" The
attorney's fear of damage to his bank account and his reputation will
0 For these reasons,
force him to more faithfully comply with the Code. 11

breach of an applicable Code provision should serve as the basis for
private causes of action.,"
Expanded application of the Code in civil actions is the best method
to deter Code violations. The disciplinary system inadequately protects
the intended beneficiaries of the Code. Expanded Code use would
encourage more competent and ethical attorney behavior. In order to
deter future violations and to make victims whole, courts should not
hesitate to use the Code as the basis for private actions against attorneys.
B.

Arguments Opposing an Expanded Code Use

One obstacle to applying the Code as courts would apply a statute
is the explicit Code warning that it "does not undertake to define
standards for civil liability."1 2 One commentator points out, however,
that this "should be read as Code neutrality, not hostility." 3 Because
the Code is not a legislative enactment, but a judicial one, 114 comts
have more leeway to creatively use the Code. 115 Courts do not have
to wrestle with the fiction of legislative intent because attorney stan-

109. Id. at 291 & n.45.
110. Id. at 292-93; see Mutnick, supra note 105; Steinberg, The Disciplinary Rules and
Competence of Counsel: A Proposed Alternative, 11 GONZ. L. REV. 133 (1975).
111. See Wolfram, supra note 20, at 291-92. Proponents of extensive use of the Code offer
another general justification for its use in civil actions against attorneys. They argue Code
standards are analogous to custom or work practices and therefore are relevant to determine
a standard of care in negligence actions. The Code would help narrow the vague ordinary care
standard of malpractice. Id. at 293-95; see Comment, supra note 20, at 696-99.
112. CODE, supra note 4, Preliminary Statement.
113. Wolfram, supra note 20, at 287. But see Clay, supra note 91, at 37-38.
Clay notes that both the Code and the Rules prohibit an attorney from entering into an
agreement limiting liability for malpractice. See CODE, supra note 4, DR 6-102; RULES, supra
note 5, Rule 1.8(h). The disciplinary codes, therefore, are not neutral with respect to malpractice
since in the absence of the code prohibitions lawyers could contract to limit or exclude malpractice
liability; see also Faure & Strong, supra note 91, at 374 ("Applying disciplinary standards in
civil cases ignores the reasoning of their drafters.").
114. See Wolfram, supra note 20, at 284-85. In most jurisdictions the Code has been promulgated by court action. Ultimate authority to judge violations and sanctions rests with the
appellate courts of the jurisdiction. Id.; see also Wolfram, supra note 3, at 632 (ABA launched
an organized campaign to persuade state supreme courts to adopt the Code).
115. See Wolfram, supra note 20, at 288.
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dards of conduct are traditionally matters exclusively for the judical
branch.116 The state bodies that adopt the state Codes, state supreme
11 7
courts, have ultimate jurisdiction over their use.
Another obstacle preventing Code use to create private causes of
action is that statutes are only appropriately applied if they create
duties toward a specific group of plaintiffs." Only when a plaintiff is
a member of the class of persons intended to be protected will courts
imply a cause of action from the statute. 19 Critics of an expansive use
of the Code argue that since the Code is designed to protect the legal
system as a whole, it creates only public remedies.120 One critic fears
that the expanded use of the Code would create "a myriad of legally
cognizable duties. '12, Although this argument may be worthwhile regarding provisions designed to protect abstract entities such as the
courts, 1" the adversary system,'2 or the public in general,124 certain
Code provisions are clearly designed to protect the party opponent
and other specified third parties. 12 In addition, courts commonly wrestle with the question of whether statutes protect specified classes of
persons.' 2 Courts should not hesitate to interpret the Code in a similar
manner, but should use Code provisions that clearly protect identifiable
classes of persons as the basis for private causes of action for those
plaintiffs.
Critics have also argued that other flaws exist in the analogy between the Code and criminal statutes.127 First, they argue that many

116. Id. On the power of the judiciary to regulate the legal profession, see Wolfram, supra
note 3, at 630-36 (1978); Note, The Inherent Power of the JudiciaJ to Regulate the Practice
of Law - A Proposed Delineation, 60 MINN. L. REv. 783 (1976); Comment, Separation of
Powers: Who Should Control the Bar?, 47 J. URB. L. 715 (1969).
117. See Wolfram, supra note 3, at 636-37.
118. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 28, at 224-25.
119. Id.
120. Dahlquist, supra note 20, at 15. Some courts consider any type of attorney wrongdoing
a "public wrong" that should not be addressed in a private action. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v.
Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979); Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Elgin Coal, 358 F.
Supp. 17, 22 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), affd mern., 477 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1973).
121. Dahlquist, supra note 20, at 19. This argument is also related to the privity argument.
See infra notes 136-67.
122. See, e.g., CODE, supra note 4, DR 7-106.
123. See, eg., id. E.C. 7-19 to 7-39.
124. See, e.g., id. Preliminary Statement, EC 2-1, DR 2-101.
125. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text; infra notes 233-49 and accompanying
text.
126. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 28, § 36, at 224-25.
127. See infra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
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Code provisions12 do not set a standard of conduct because they are
too vague. 12 This objection is primarily a problem of interpretation.
Courts interpret statutes constantly, and are just as capable of construing Code provisions as construing other laws. 13° Expert testimony can
be employed to help interpret Code provisions just as it is used to
determine whether criminal statutes have been violated and to complement statutes in jurisdictions where a violation is only evidence of
negligence.13' Therefore, the ambiguity found in the Code is no different than the ambiguity in other statutes and is not a persuasive reason
to exclude the Code from civil actions.
Finally, critics argue that the Code is not equivalent to criminal
statutes because state legislatures need not adopt the Code.12 Courts,

however, have used other business and professional standards, as well
.
as administrative regulations that are not legislatively created. 1'3
Therefore, the Code should not be rejected merely because it is a
judicial document.
Admittedly, applying the Code to civil actions may require more
careful judicial interpretation than applying many criminal statutes.13
In addition, many Code provisions are not suitable for use in civil
actions.- 15 Interpretive obstacles should not absolutely bar use of all
Code provisions in civil actions, however, because courts are familiar

128. E.g., CODE, supra note 4, DR 1-102, 2-106, 3-102, 4-101(B)(2), 4-101(D), 5-101(A),
6-101(A)(2), 6-101(A)(3), 7-109, 8-101(A)(1), 9-102(B).
129. See Dahlquist, supra note 20, at 4 & nn.25-26; Levy, Time to Review the Code, 62
A.B.A. J. 225 (1976); Patterson, A PreliminaryRationalizationof the Law of Legal Ethics, 57
N.C.L. REV. 519, 524 (1978); Sutton, How Vulnerable is the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility?, 57 N.C.L. REV. 497, 497-500; Wolfram, supra note 20, at 625-28.
Some courts and commentators have argued parts of the Code are unconstitutionally void
for vagueness. See, e.g., Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979) (parts of
DR 1-107 held void for vagueness); Comment, ABA Code of ProfessionalResponsibility: Void
for Vagueness?, 57 N.C.L. REv. 671 (1981). But see In re Fredricks, 238 N.W.2d 764 (Iowa
1976) (DR 8-102(B) held not vague); In re Keiler, 380 A.2d 119 (D.C. 1977) (DR 1-102(A)(5)
not unconstitutionally vague).
130. Comment, Attorney Professional Responsibility: Competence Through Malpractice
Liability, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 633, 663-64 (1983).
131. Id.
132. In most jurisdictions the Code (or Rules) is adopted by court order. In a few states
adoption is solely through bar association approval. Wolfram, supra note 20, at 284-85; see
Wolfram, supra note 3, at 630-36.
133. See supra note 94.
134. See supra notes 118-31 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 122-24.
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with statutory construction problems. Therefore, appropriate Code
provisions should be treated analogously to criminal statutes and used
as the basis for private actions.
The strongest objection to the expanded Code use stems from the
restrictive privity doctrines that govern attorney liability.13r6 Traditionally, attorney liability was not extended to third persons because
courts required contractual privity between parties before one party
could be liable to another. 137 Although strict contractual privity is no
longer an element of certain legal malpractice actions, 13 courts have

only slowly and grudgingly relaxed attorneys' immunity to claims of
third parties. 139 While authority still exists for the proposition that an
attorney owes a duty only to his client, 40 over the past three decades
courts have begun to chip away at the strict privity requirement in
legal malpractice contexts. 141 Most jurisdictions, for example, have
extended an attorney's duty to the would-be beneficiary of a negligently prepared will.12 In fact, only one jurisdiction has rejected this
143
cause of action.
Courts have employed several theories to find a duty in favor of
a third party. The California approach, for example, involves a case

136.

Many commentators have written about the deterioration of the privity doctrine in

the context of attorney liability to third parties. See, e.g., D. MUSSELMAN, Attorney Malpractice:
Law and Procedure § 6:2, at 93-102 (1980); Averill, Attorney's Liability to Third Personsfor
Negligent Malpractice, 2 LAND & WATER L. REV. 379, 384-86 (1967); Meiselman, Attorney
Liability to Third Parties, 53 N.Y. ST. B.J. 108 (1981); Special Project, Third Party Actions
Against Attorneys, 33 S.C.L. REv. 311 (1981-1982); Note, Attorneys' Negligence and Third
Parties,57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 126 (1982); Note, Attorney's Liability to Third Partiesfor Malpractice: The Growing Acceptance of Liability in the Absence of Privity, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 48
[hereinafter Note, Attorney's Liability]; Comment, Lawyers' Negligence Liability to Non-Clients:
A Texas Viewpoint, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 405 (1982-83). Several commentators contend that
expanded use of the Code would upset privity concepts. See Dahlquist, supra note 20, at 19-20.
On the privity doctrine in other areas of tort law, see Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
137. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 71, at 142.
138. Id.
139. See id. §§ 78-81, at 150-62. The Supreme Court adopted the privity rule in attorney
liability cases in Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
140. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 79, at 152.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (involving a notary
public's negligent preparation of a will); see generally Comment, Attorney Malpracticein California: The Liability of a Lawyer Who Drafts an Imprecise Contract or Will, 24 UCLA L. REV.
422 (1976).
143. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 79, at 154.
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by case balancing of six criteria:14 the extent to which the transaction
was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to the
plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the
closeness between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered,
the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy
of preventing future harm. 145 The most important factor in this analysis

is whether the services were intended to benefit the plaintiff.146 Other
courts have treated certain attorneys' services as creating a third-party
beneficiary contract. 147 Other jurisdictions have created privity by sta-

tute.

Common to each of these methods is the non-adversarial re-

lationship between the attorney and plaintiff in their original dealings.

At the other end of the spectrum lie actions brought by party
opponents against the attorney who litigated the original action. No
court in the nation has recognized such an action in negligence. 149 This
limitation is based on two related problems. Courts perceive extending
a duty to third persons as interference with attorney ability to zeal- Courts
ously represent the client. 1o
reason that any duty to a third
person will dilute attorneys' loyalty to their own clients.151 Courts are

144. Biakanja, 49 Cal. App. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19. A later California case added the
consideration of whether recognition of liability would unduly burden the legal profession. Lucas
v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 590, 364 P.2d 685, 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824 (1981). At least one
Florida court has used this balancing test. See McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1976).
The balancing test has been applied in non-will related actions. See, e.g., Donald v. Garry,
19 Cal. App. 3d 769, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1971) (attorney employed by collection agency was sued
by creditor who was a client of the collection agency).
145. Biakanja, 49 Cal. App. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
146. 'See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 80, at 157.
147. See, e.g., Lucas, 56 Cal. App. 2d at 590, 364 P.2d at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
148. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 80, at 160.
149. See supra notes 66-94 and accompanying text.
150. There is general agreement that lawyers owe their clients a duty of zealous representation, often called fiduciary obligation. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 226, at
220; Patterson, supra note 135, at 536-40.
151. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 127, at 222.
The privity requirement protects against chilling the lawyer's willingness to accept cases
and to zealously represent the client. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 80, at 159
("The primary obstacle to expanding privity has been the potential effect upon future attorneyclient relations because of derogation from an attorney's ethical obligations and independent
judgment."); see generally Tappan v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376 (10th Cir. 1979); Norton v. Hines, 49
Cal. App. 3d 917, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975); Ammerman v. Newman, 384 A.2d 637 (D.C. 1978);
Berlin v. Nattan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978); Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271,
607 P.2d 438 (1980); Hill v. Wilmott, 561 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Spencer v. Burglass,
337 So. 2d 596 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Comment, supra note 130, at 642-45; sources cited supra
note 136.
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also concerned that attorneys might be overly cautious in accepting
15 2
cases, thereby denying certain legitimate plaintiffs their day in court.
Therefore, to preserve freedom of access to the courts, the Code is
not used as a basis for private causes of action against attorneys.
Nonetheless, a strong countervailing concern has arisen to challenge an attorney's absolute immunity to liability to non-clients: the
need to deter frivolous litigation. Over-crowded dockets and long delays before trial deny parties effective access to the courts. As a
response to the high frequency of tort litigation, courts and legislatures
have recently imposed sanctions on parties and attorneys who initiate
"bad faith" proceedings. '-' More and more courts are assessing fees
and applying other sanctions against these claimants and their attorneys.r 4
On the legislative front, two important devices were recently added
to federal practice to penalize the over-zealous attorney. First, in 1980
the federal rule governing counsel's liability for excessive costs was
amended to give courts the power to assess an opponent's attorneys'
fees against an attorney acting in bad faith."15 In addition, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 now imposes attorneys' fees on an attorney
who fails to conduct a reasonable investigation ' s6 to assure that the
action is "well-grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or
is a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law.''1 57 These measures demonstrate the intent of courts
and legislatures to penalize the attorney for filing frivolous actions.
Courts should use certain Code provisions as the basis for private
causes of action as another weapon to combat frivolous or bad faith

152. See cases cited supra note 151.
153. See Cann, FrivolousLawsuits - The Lawyer's Duty to Say "No," 31 DEF. 24 (1982);
Hermann, Frivolous Criminal Appeals, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 701 (1972); Hurley, Much Ado
About Nothing - An Epidemic of Frivolous Lawsuits is Turning Our Legal System Into the
Courtroom of the Absurd, 17 DOCKET CALL 14 (1982); Oberman, Coping With Rising Caseload:
Defining the Frivolous Civil Appeal (pt. 2), 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1057 (1981).
154. The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752
(1980), encouraged this increased vigilance. In Roadway, the Court held that a federal court
has the power to assess attorney's fees against an attorney in favor of his client's adversary
for maintaining a bad faith action. Id. at 765; see Groenburger, The Cost of Justice:An American
Problem, An English Solution, 9 VILL. L. REV. 400 (1964); Note, Use of Taxable Costs to
Regulate the Conduct of Litigants, 53 COLUm. L. REV. 78 (1953).
155. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982).
156. FED. R. CIV. P. 11, Advisory Committee Note.
157. Id.; see also FED. R. App. P. 38 (provides that if "a court of appeals shall determine
that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages and single or double eosts to the appellee").
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actions. While the argument that a duty to a third party Will dilute
attorneys' zealous representation of their clients is persuasive, this
should not be a reason for excluding Code provisions from application
in civil suits. The very purpose of certain disciplinary rules is to place
boundaries on attorneys' efforts to represent their clients.1 5s These
rules should be viewed as statutory exceptions to the privity doctrine.
For instance, DR 7-102 prohibits an attorney from filing malicious
actions.159 In essence, this Code provision is a limit on what attorneys
can ethically do for their clients. But this boundary is not an arbitrary
one. The authors of the Code sought to prevent attorneys from aiding
their clients in harassing or malicious suits. This limit, codified in the
Code, should be respected by the courts. An expanded Code use as
the basis for private causes of action will yield increased attorney
compliance with Code provisions and also reduce the amount of frivolous litigation. 160
The O'Toole court rationale, emphasizing the scienter requirement
in Code provisions, 16' suggests another way tb avoid privity prohibitions. The privity doctrine only applies to actions based on negligence, 62 and has never protected attorneys from actions based on
intentional torts.'16 Traditionally, courts have recognized actions for
fraud, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and interference with
1
an advantageous relationship brought by party opponents. 64
Many Code provisions have an express or implied scienter requirement. 16 5 The violation of these Code provisions should be considered
intentional, not negligent, torts. These provisions should be viewed
not as extending a reasonable duty of care to party opponents, but
rather as redefining the proper standards for an intentional tort.
For example, courts could interpret DR 7-102 in civil actions as
preventing attorneys from knowingly bringing frivolous actions. 166 DR
7-102 would be similar to other legislation barring malicious prosecu-

158. See Wolfram, supra note 20, at 296.
159. CODE, supra note 4, DR 7-102.
160. See Wolfram, supra note 20, at 292.
161. O'Toole, 279 Or. at 513, 569 P.2d at 561; see supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
162. See Note, Attorney's Liability, supra note 136, at 48.
163. See id. at 48 n.4. Courts also recognize certain procedural safeguards that an attorney
owes to a party opponent. See Patterson, supra note 129, at 548-54. There seems to be a trend
toward broadening the definition of intentional torts against lawyers. See, e.g., Slotkin v. Citizens
Casualty Co., 614 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1979).
164. See Note, Attorney's Liability, supra note 136, at 48 n.4.
165. See, e.g., CODE, supra note 4, DR 7-102; Dahlquist, supra note 20, at 18-19.
166. Some courts have interpreted DR 7-102 as requiring a subjective test. See Dahlquist,
supra note 20, at 29.
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tion actions.16 7 Therefore, the debate about whether the Code can be
used to expand attorney liability for negligent acts toward third persons would not apply to many Code provisions. Courts should apply
these Code provisions as standards for intentional torts and dispense
with the privity requirement.
Some theorists oppose an expanded Code use because they believe
there should be a difference between the standard of conduct applied
in disciplinary actions and the standard of conduct applied in civil
damage actions.6S Civil actions based on negligence presuppose an
absence of intent, while many Code violations imply an element of
intent.G9 This argument is persuasive when one considers applying
negligence standards in disciplinary actions. A missed deadline is
proper grounds for a civil damage recovery, but not grounds for disbarment or suspension.170 This argument, however, does not demonstrate why a disciplinary standard, knowledge, should not be applied
to civil actions. If an attorney violates a rule in which the basis for
liability is knowledge or intent, this should suffice to prove civil liability, which normally requires only proof of negligence.
IV.

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

171

The scope note of the Rules clearly states that "violation of a rule
should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it create any

167. According to Horan & Spellinre, malicious prosecution actions require the following
elements:
1. Institution and prosecution of a prior judicial proceeding by the defendants.
2. Termination of the prior judicial proceeding in favor of the plaintiff.
3. Lack of probable cause for the institution and prosecution of the prior
proceeding.
4. Malice on the part of the defendants in instituting the prior judicial proceeding.
5. And in some jurisdictions special injury to the plaintiff beyond damage
resulting from anxiety, loss of time, attorney fees, and damage to reputation that
are an incident of most lawsuits.
HORAN & SPELLMIRE, supra note 1, ch. 3, at 1.
168. Dahlquist, supra note 20, at 18-19.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 18.
171. For a general discussion of the Rules, see Bowman, The Proposed Model Rules of
Professional Conduct: What Hath the ABA Wrought?, 13 PAC. L.J. 273 (1982); Gratke, Why
Kentucky Should Adopt the A.B.A.'s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 74 Ky. L.J. 581
(1985-1986); Kuhlman, PennsylvaniaConsiders the A.B.A. Model Rules of Conduct, 59 TEip.
L.Q. 419 (1986); Walter, An Overview of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 24
WASHBURN L.J. 443 (1985); Note, Movement in Attitude and Structure From the Code to the
Model Rules, 9 WAI. MITCHELL L. REv. 341 (1983) [hereafter Movement in Attitude].

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1987

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [1987], Art. 6

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. :39

presumption that a legal duty has been breached ....
They are not
designed to be a basis for civil liability.' 12 Nonetheless, the Rules
lend themselves to extensive application in civil actions. Certain provisions are particularly appropriate for expanding attorneys' duties to
17
specified third parties.13 The theory,- organization and structure,
and semantics76 of the Rules are "legislative" in nature and should be
applied to civil actions.
A.

Purpose, Theory, and Perception7

The ABA's Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards
(the "Kutak Commission," named after its chairman, Robert J.

Robert Kutak, chairman of the commission drafting the Rules and a vehement proponent of
the Rules, has written several articles. See, e.g., Kutak, Coming: the New Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A. J. 46 (1980) [hereinafter Coming: The New Rules]; Kutak,
Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct: Why Do We Need Them?, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 311 (1983);
Kutak, The Next Step in Legal Ethics: Some Observations About the Proposed Model Rules of
ProfessionalConduct, 30 CATH. U.L. REV. 1 (1980) [hereinafter The Next Step]. The thoughts
of the chief draftsman are found in Hazard, Rules of Ethics: The DraftingTask, 36 REc. A.B.
CITY N.Y. 77 (1981).

For criticisms of the Model Rules, see, e.g., Elliot, Proposed Model Rules of Professional
Conduct: Invention Not Mothered by Necessity?, 54 CONN. B.J. 265 (1980); Gillers, What We
Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO
ST. L.J. 243 (1985); Kaufman, A CriticalFirstLook at the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct,
66 A.B.A. J. 1074 (1980); Koskoff, Proposed New Code of ProfessionalResponsibility: 1984 is
Now, 54 CONN. B.J. 260 (1980).
Various articles have examined specific aspects of the Rules. See, e.g., Riger, The Model
Rules and Corporate Practice - New Ethics for a Competitive Era, 17 CONN. L. REV. 729
(1984-1985); Rotunda, The Notice of Withdrawal and the New Model Rules of Conduct: Blowing
the Whistle and Waving the Red Flag, 63 OR. L. REV. 455 (1984); Smith, Ethics for Trial
Lawyers During Pretrial Stages - Florida's New Rules of Professional Conduct, 5 TRIAL
ADvoc. Q. 11 (1986); Symposium on Rule 1.6 (Atty-Client Confidentiality), 13 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 3 (1985); Note, Proposed Rule 1.6: Its Effect on a Lawyer's Moral and Ethical Decisions
With Regard to Atty-Client Privilege, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 561 (1983).
172. RULES, supra note 5, Scope no. b.
173. See infra notes 233-49.
174. See infra notes 185-201.
175. See infra notes 202-17.
176. See infra notes 218-33.
177. See infra notes 178-84 and accompanying text; see also The Next Step, supra note
171, at 2-5. Kutak mentions several reasons for reconsidering the Code and for creating the Rules:
1) The dramatic changes in the practice of law in the past decade: the movement
of lawyers away from small or independent practice to larger law firms; the differing
nature of the clientele from individuals to corporations and other impersonal entities;
the emerging recognition of the roles an attorney undertakes complementing the
attorney as advocate - adviser, negotiator, mediator, counsellor and evaluator.
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Kutak),1 s8 drafted the Rules and attempted to codify the standards 179
of
today.
America
in
practiced
are
they
as
responsibility
professional
The complete replacement of the Code only fourteen years after its
adoption was not an attempt to reform, but an effort to better represent the status quo of the profession.s° While the format of the Rules
differs considerably from the format of the Code, 181 substantively the
differences are slight.182 The Rules contain many of the concepts and
much of the language of the Code.1' The substantive standards of
conduct were not changed, but the Kutak Commission attempted to
clarify those standards and make them enforceable. The Rules were
designed to be "more truly legislative both in technical style and
intended function."' The courts should treat the Rules accordingly
and should freely imply private causes of action when the Rules clearly
intend to protect specified non-clients.
Scholars have long debated whether the standards regulating the
legal profession should be moral precepts or rules of law.', The merits
of each are beyond the scope of this note. The development from the
Code to the Rules, however, manifests a clear trend toward viewing
the standards governing the professional conduct of attorneys as substantive rules of law.'1 Modern professional responsibility is no longer
a matter of aspirational goals, but consists of legal rules. 8
2) The Supreme Court decisions which demanded new approaches to attorney
advertising and soliciting, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975);
Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 412 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 350 (1977).
3) The widespread acceptance of providing legal services to the persons unable
to afford them.
Id.
178. The group that drafted the Model Rules, the ABA Commission on Evaluation of
Professional Standards, is often called the Kutak Commission for its late chairman Robert Kutak.
179. See Coning: The New Rules, supra note 171, at 46; The Next Step, supra note 171, at 6.
180. Coming: The New Rules, supra note 171, at 47.
181. See infra notes 202-17 and accompanying text.
182. See The Next Step, supra note 171, at 2.
183. See Coming: The New Rules, supra note 171, at 47.
184. The Next Step, supra note 171, at 5.
185. See Patterson, The Function of a Code of Legal Ethics, 35 U. MIAmI L. Rnv. 695
(1981); Patterson, supra note 135; Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 Aim.
BAR FOUND. REs. J. 953; Movement in Attitude, supra note 180.
186. See Schwartz, supra note 129, at 953-54. The Model Rules
[r]epresent the culmination of a historical process that began a century and a half
ago: the shift from articulating professional standards, suffused with ideas of morality and ethics, and enforced if at all by informal sanctions and peer pressure, to
enacting comprehensive and explicit legislation attended by formally imposed sanctions for breach.
Id.
187. Id.; see infra notes 218-32 and accompanying text.
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The distinction between legal rules and ethical standards is not a
philosophical one. A standard perceived as moral or ethical is considered a suggestion or a recommendation. Legal rules, on the other
hand, are mandatory, and if violated, penalties will be applied. 1' In

addition, since criminal statutes are legal rules, 189 the analogy between
professional regulations and criminal statutes is more accurate when
the professional regulations are framed as substantive rules of law.
Therefore, since the Rules more closely resemble substantive law than
the Code, the Rules serve as a better basis for private causes of action
than the Code.
As a leading commentator has pointed out, neither courts nor
lawyers perceive the Code of Professional Responsibility as a set of

legal rules. 19 Unlike criminal statutes, the Code is not considered a
set of minimum standards of conduct, the violation of which will result
in penalty. Although the Disciplinary Rules of the Code were intended
to be mandatory, 19' they are not regarded as such.
The perception of the Code as ethical precepts is not surprising in
light of the history of professional regulations controlling the bar,1 2
and the structure' 93 and wording'9 of the Code. The new format of
the Rules0 5 could radically change this perception. The Rules' back-

188. Patterson, supra note 129, at 520 & n.5; see W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL
LAW § 1.2 (1986).
189. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 188, § 1.2.
190. Patterson, supra note 129, at 519-28.
191. CODE, supranote 4, Preliminary Statement; see infra note 204 and accompanying text.
192. In the United States there was no nationally adopted model code of ethics until 1908.
Walter, supra note 171, at 444. Throughout the nineteenth century, a lawyer's professional
conduct was governed, if at all, by common law. There were unofficial codes of attorney conduct.
Id. The most prominent of these was David Hoffman's "Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment," issued in 1836 and later published as A COURSE IN LEGAL STUDY (1846),
and Judge George Sharswood's 1854 lecture series, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.
Bowman, supra note 171, at 274-77. In 1887 the Alabama State Bar became the first state bar
to adopt an advisory code of ethics. In 1908 the ABA adopted the Canons of Professional
Responsibility. Walter, supra note 171, at 144. The Canons did not provide for any punitive
measures for their violation. The Canons, like the unofficial Codes preceding them, were "nothing
more than a pious declaration of what a lawyer ought to do." Bowman, supra note 171, at 282.
Nonetheless the Canons were not replaced until 1969, when the ABA adopted the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility.
For the history of codes governing the legal profession, see H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS
1-55 (1953); Armstrong, A Century of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 1063 (1978); Bowman, supra
note 171, at 274-85.
193. See infra notes 202-17 and accompanying text.
194. See infra notes 218-32 and accompanying text.
195. See infra notes 202-17 and accompanying text.
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ground, 19 format, 1' 7 organization,19s and wording,199 manifest the designers' intent to create a legislative-type document of substantive law. 200
Unlike the Code, the Rules set out minimum standards of conduct
2
and have eliminated many of the moral overtones of the Code. 01
B.

Fornmt and Language

The most striking change in the Rules from the Code is the format.212 The Code consists of a three-tiered system of Canons (broad
principles), Ethical Considerations (aspirational and explanatory provisions), and Disciplinary Rules (black letter law).2 03 Only the Discipli-

nary Rules are mandatory. 2°4 Commentators have identified several

196. See supra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
197. See infra notes 202-17 and accompanying text.
198. See id.
199. See mfra notes 218-32 and accompanying text.
200. One commentator, however, asserts that "because [the Code] explicitly eschews the
idea that the rules are standards for determining ... civil liability," the ethical (non-legal) view
of the Code is substantiated. Patterson, supra note 129, at 521. While the Rules are subject
to the same criticism, the courts of this nation could change the perception of attorneys and
increase the level of compliance with the Rules by using them as the basis for civil liability.
201. See Movement in Attitude, supra note 171.
202. The change in format is discussed approvingly in Bowman, supra note 171, at 290-91;
Gaetke, supra note 171, at 586; The Next Step, supra note 171, at 5-6; Moser, The Model Rules:
Is One Format Better Than Another?, 67 A.B.A. J. 1624 (1981); Movement in Attitude, supra
note 171, at 360.
Prior to adoption of the Model Rules, some commentators opposed changing the format. See,
e.g., Kettlewell, Keep the Format of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, 67 A.B.A. J. 1628
(1981). Kettlewell argued the Code format should be retained because it was familiar to lawyers,
disciplinary boards and legal scholars and because of the case law and analysis that concern the
Code. Id.; see also Kaufman, A CriticalFirstLook at the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct,
66 A.B.A. J. 1079 (1980) (identifying several shortcomings of the Rules).
203. See CODE, supra note 4.
204. See id. Preliminary Statement.
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms
the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers ....
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive. They constitute
a body of principles upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific
situations.
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in
character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which
no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action ....
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problems with this format.205 First, it is cumbersome and confusing.2 w
Lawyers cannot easily determine what their obligations are. More
important, courts and disciplinary bodies apply the Ethical Considerations ("EC's") inconsistently.207 The EC's were designed to be aspirational.208 Some EC's serve as explanations of the DR's and others seem
to state mandatory requirements.20 As a result, some courts have
based decisions on the EC's alone.l Finally, the broad language of
the Canons and the EC's allows lawyers to narrow the meanings of
the DR's. 21, The Rules were designed to remedy these deficiencies.

205. For these and other criticisms of the Code, see J. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR:
Do ABOUT IT (1978); Denecke, Complexities
of Modern PracticeRequire Changes in Oregon Ethics Code, 19 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 621
(1983); Levy, Time to Review the Code, 62 A.B.A. J. 225 (1976); Morgan, The Evolving Concept
of ProfessionalResponsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977); Schnapper, The Myth of Legal
Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 202 (1978); Sutton, supra note 129; Walter, supra note 180, at 445-52.
206. See Moser, supra note 202, at 1624-25. "[To analyze some problems under the C.P.R.,
a lawyer must review numerous canons, ethical considerations, and disciplinary rules not easily
discovered in diverse locations and having no apparent relationship to one another and must
research case law as well." Id. at 1626; see also Movement in Attitude, supra note 171, at 350
(although Code's topical headings are logically organized, aspects of attorney-client relationship
are "scattered").
207. See infra note 223.
208. CODE, supra note 4, Preliminary Statement; see supra note 204.
209. See, e.g. CODE, supra note 4, EC 4-6 (lawyer should not sell business when so doing
would reveal client secrets or confidences), EC 7-21 (lawyer should not threaten legal action to
settle civil claim that constitutes abuse of trial process), EC 7-24 (lawyer should not comment
on evidence unless under sworn testimony), EC 7-33 (lawyer should not reveal information
regarding upcoming trial to reporters).
210. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Davison, 318 So. 2d 385 (Fla.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995
(1975) (attorney disbarred for violating EC 5-B); Committee v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa
1979); Committee v. Durham, 279 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1979); In re Sullivan, 494 S.W.2d 329 (Mo.
1973); see generally Bowman, supra note 171, at 291; Hazard, Legal Ethics: Legal Rules and
Professional Aspirations, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 571, 573 (1982); Walter, supra note 171, at
451; Note, Lawyer DisciplinaryStandards:Broad v. Narrow Proscriptions,65 IOWA L. REV.
1386 (1980); Movement in Attitude, supra note 171, at 358.
211. See Hazard, supra note 171, at 87-88. Hazard states:
Canons and Ethical Considerations move in opposite directions from the Disciplinary
Rules ....Simply put, the Canons and Ethical Considerations narrowthe meaning
of the black letter Disciplinary Rules. They do this by preempting any extensive
interpretation that the Disciplinary Rules might be given in penumbral areas around
LAWYERS' UNETHICAL ETHICS AND WHAT TO

the black-letter . .

.

. [T]he Canons and Ethical Considerations by implication

depress the rules to the lowest level of meaning that their literal words admit.
Id.; see also Patterson, supranote 129, at 523-25. Patterson argues that two sets of standards,
one ethical (Canons and EC's) and one legal (DR's) create "confusion for the conscientious and
opportunity for the cynical lawyer." Id. at 525. According to Patterson, the attempt to derive
legal rules from ethical principles, as the Code has done, is doomed to fail because the principle
can be used to undermine the efficacy of the rules. Id.
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The Rules have been modeled after the familiar American Law
Institute Restatement format. They contain black letter rules of law
and explanatory comments. This format serves several goals. First,
much of the ambiguity resulting from the three tiered Code system
is eliminated.212 Second, lawyers are more familiar with the Restatement format and will therefore be better able and more apt to look
to the Rules for guidance. 213 Finally, the Restatement format gives
attorneys - especially lawyers just entering the bar who have no
experience with the Code - the perception that the Rules of Professional Conduct stand on the same footing as other Restatements of the
law. Attorneys will view the Rules as substantive law.
The structure of the Rules is also more conducive to regulating
the conduct of attorneys than is the Code. The Code was structured
around nine Canons. Each Canon stated a high-brow moral aspiration.211 These aspirations are not practical guidelines in the day-to-day
life of an attorney. The self-evident truth that the "lawyer should
assist in maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal profession"'2 is an ineffective guide for the practicing lawyer. The Rules,
on the other hand, are structured around the various roles the lawyer
undertakes in practice. 2'6 The subject headings include "Client-Lawyer
Relationship," "Counselor," "Advocate," and "Transactions with Persons Other than Clients." This structure emphasizes the daily conduct
of the attorney. The ultimate goal of the Rules, regulating conduct,
is clearly expressed. The structure also makes the Rules more acces217
sible and more useable.
212. See Bowman, supra note 171, at 290; Moser, supra note 202, at 1625.
One commentator worries that the Rule-Comment set-up will be equally problematic. Kaufman, supra note 202, at 1076. The counterargument to Kaufman's concerns is that courts will
be better able to interpret the new Rules because courts are familiar with the Restatement
format. See, e.g., Moser, supra note 202, at 1624.
213. See Bowman, supra note 171, at 290; Moser, supra note 202, at 1625-26; Movement
in Attitude, supra note 171, at 360.
214. See e.g., CODE, supranote 4, Canon 9 (A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance
of Professional Impropriety).
215. Id. Canon 1.
216. See Bowman, supra note 171, at 294-98; Moser, supra note 202, at 1627 (rules "permit
a lawyer seeking to resolve a problem to focus on what the lawyer is doing when the problem
arises"); Walter, supra note 171, at 453; Movement in Attitude, supra note 171, at 349-50; see
also Schwartz, supra note 185, at 960-62 (praises the categorization of the Rules according to
the attorney's function (adviser, advocate, negotiator, intermediary and evaluator), context (i.e.,
criminal defense, government representation, organizational representation) and status (i.e.,
sole practitioner, lawyer as employee in law firm, lawyer as employer in law firm)).
217. See Moser, supra note 202, at 1625. According to Moser, the format "gives accurate
answers more quickly ....
Faced with a crisis when a client is in the office or a trial is under
way and an unanticipated ethical problem surfaces, the busy lawyer should not be forced to do
needless, time-consuming research to get an answer. Yet, that is what the C.P.R. frequently
requires." Id.
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In addition to the format and structure of the Rules, the very
language of the Rules is better designed to regulate conduct than is
the Code language. Several changes give the Rules a "rhetorical respectability" the Code does not possess. 21 The new phraseology more
closely resembles common statutory phraseology by setting clear
standards of care, and is therefore more appropriate for use as the
29
basis for civil liability. 1
Commentators have often accused the Code of being vague.20 Although the Rules could not eliminate all ambiguity necessarily associated with professional conduct, several important provisions are
more precise than their Code counterparts.2 1 For instance, Rule 1. 1,
dealing with attorney competence, is a major improvement over Code
DR 6-101(A). DR 6-101(A)(1) prevents a lawyer from handling "a legal
matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent to
handle. '" 3 Courts rarely use this provision in civil actions because it
is vague and ambiguous.- In the Rules, Rule 1.1 creates the affirmative duty to "provide competent representation. '"M More important,
the Rule identifies the elements of competent representation: "legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation. '' 6 Courts are provided more guidance to determine whether an attorney breached a
standard of care.
Semantically,2 the Rules contain predominantly descriptive wording defining proper conduct. The Code, on the other hand, is phrased
in prescriptive terms defining moral aspirations.m For example, the
word "code" has moral connotations, while "rules" tend to describe
conduct.2 The Rules are directed toward the practical idea of "professional conduct" rather than the abstract "professional responsibility."230

218. See Movement in Attitude, supra note 171, at 348.
219. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
221. Compare CODE, supra note 4, DR 6-101(A) (stating that a lawyer shall not handle a
matter in which he is incompetent) uith RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.1 (clarifying competence
as requiring legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for
representation).
222. RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.1.
223. CODE, supra note 4, DR 6-101(A).
224. See supra note 23.
225. RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.1.
226. Id.
227. See generally Movement in Attitude, supra note 171, at 342-49.

228.

Id.

229.

Id. at 342-43.

230.

Id.
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The section title headings exemplify this new emphasis. The Code,
for example, prescribes an abstract goal to "fulfill [a] duty to Make
Legal Counsel Available," 3 1 while the Rules are concerned with "infor'' 2
mation about legal services. 1
Regarding professional regulations governing the Bar, perception
is as important as reality. Only when attorneys and courts treat professional standards as substantive law will attorneys use them to guide
their daily conduct. The Rules are designed to represent the substantive law of professional conduct. Courts should use the Rules as they
would use any other statutes of substantive law.
C.

Expansion of Scope to Non-Clients

The Rules' drafters intended to provide non-clients with greater
protection within the legal system.33 As the chairman of the ABA
Commission of Evaluation of Professional Responsibility commented
when the rules were being drafted, "in the representation of clients
the ethical lawyer has duties that run to persons and institutions who
are strangers to the client-lawyer relationship."' 32 The "legislative"
intent of the drafters was to protect the rights of non-clients. Naturally, protection of non-client rights means a concomitant diminution
of client rights.2 The merits of this reapportionment of rights within
the legal system are beyond the scope of this note;23 6 however, the
Rules clearly represent a trend toward increased non-client rights.23 7
The Rules protect the rights of the party opponent more explicitly
and to a greater extent than does the Code. A complete section of
the Rules is devoted to "Transactions with Persons Other than
Clients." 8s The section explicitly addresses truthfulness to others,23 9
communications with persons represented by counsel,4 0 communication
with unrepresented persons,3 1 and respect for rights of third per-

2:31.

CODE, supra note 4, Canon 8.

232. RULES, suprra note 5, § 6 (title heading of section).
2:33.
at 48.
2:34.
235.
236.
servant.
237.
2:38.
2:39.
240.
241.

See The Next Step, supra note 171, at 6-7; Coming: The New Rules, supra note 171,
The Next Step, supra note 171, at 6.
See R. AIALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 80, at 157-58.
The Rules have been criticized on the grounds that they make the lawyer a disinterested
See Elliot, supra note 171, at 265; Koskoff, supra note 171, at 260.
See infra notes 238-48 and accompanying text.
RULES, supra note 5, § 4 (title).
Id. Rule 4.1.
Id. Rule 4.2.
Id. Rule 4.3.
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sons.2 2 Other provisions explicitly treat meritorious claims,?' 3 fairness
to opposing party and counsel,2 4 and evaluations for use by third
parties. 5 The Code does not recognize these provisions as a unified
group protecting third party rights. Instead, the Code considers rights
of non-clients merely incidental limitations on an attorney's zealous
representation of the client.- In the Code, one of these provisions
has no equivalent? 7 and several give third parties less protection. 2
Therefore, the drafters of the Rules intended to limit the zeal with
which attorneys could represent their clients vis-A-vis the rights of
third parties. To afford non-clients the protection that the drafters
intended, courts should use the appropriate provisions as the basis
for private causes of action.
V.

CONCLUSION

Courts consistently use the Code, and in states where adopted,
the Rules, to define common law duties attorneys owe to clients, 49
but have steadfastly rejected the Code and Rules as the basis for
creating duties to non-clients. 0 Courts justify this rejection by relying
on the rapidly deteriorating privity doctrine21 and on problems of
interpretation.22 Each major argument opposing an expanded Code
use has been met by a cogent rebuttal.2 The benefits of an expanded
Code use, measured by increased attorney compliance, outweigh the
costs of an expanded application.

242. Id. Rule 4.4.
243. Id. Rule 3.1.
244. Id. Rule 3.4.
245.

Id. Rule 2.3.

246. The equivalent Code provision is "[a] Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously
Within the Bounds of the Law." CODE, supra note 4, Canon 7. Thus third party rights are
viewed only as limits on an attorney's representation of his client, not as affirmative goals
themselves.
247. There is no Code equivalent for Rule 2.3.
248. Compare Rule 3.1 with DR 7-102(A)(1). There are two important differences. First,
the test of improper conduct is changed from "merely to harass or maliciously injure another"
in the Code to the Rule's requirement that there be a basis for the litigation measure that is
"not frivolous" - a more stringent standard. Second, the test in Rule 3.1 is an objective test,
whereas DR 7-102(A)(1) was subjective, requiring knowledge. RULES, supra note 5, Rule 3.1
Model Code comparison.
249. See supra notes 21-59 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 60-91 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 136-67 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 118-35 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 112-70 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps the rejection of an expanded Code role is best explained
as the continued over-protection of attorneys as advocates by attorneys
as judges. This protection may erode as the ever increasing numbers
of malpractice actions focus public attention on the incompetent and
unethical behavior of many attorneys. 5 In addition, the rapidly increasing number of unwarranted tort actions has encouraged courts
to discover new methods to deter frivolous litigation.2 Protection of
attorneys must come to an end and frivolous litigation must cease.
Application of the American Bar Association's professional standards
is one answer to these problems.
The Rules, unlike the Code, resemble a "legislative" document.
The format,2 6 semantics,25 and specific emphasis on the rights of non-

clients'3 make the Rules appropriate bases of private causes of action.
Since the Florida Supreme Court has recently adopted the Rules,2 9

Florida courts
order to give
compliance, to
Florida courts

are in a unique position to creatively apply them. In
the Rules their full effect, to insure a high rate of
deter frivolous litigation, and to protect non-clients,
should recognize causes of action based on the Rules.
Michael J. Benjamin

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

See
See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
sup'a notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
supra notes 202-17 and accompanying text.
supw'o notes 218-32 and accompanying text.
sup'a notes 23349 and accompanying text.
siipra note 7 and accompanying text.
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